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INVESTIGATION OF PROPELLANT AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE
DISPOSAL BY CONFINED SPACE SHOTS - II
ABSTRACT
The disposal in a confined space of both military
secondary high explosives and homogeneous propel 1 ants
has been studied. Research on an engineering basis has
been accomplished as to the feasibility of disposing of
outdated military munitions in a confined space, and
also as to the practicality of explosion product gas
recovery for reuse in explosives synthesis.
Disposal in a confined space is advantageous when
one wishes to dispose of large batch configurations of
explosive devices which are dangerous to uncase, where
another method does not exist, and from the standpoint
of environmental impact. For example, a twenty-five
ton high explosive shot may be easily contained within
a cavity of about sixty-eight feet in diameter, with
great attenuation of the shock wave and complete con-
tainment of the product gases.
Confined space disposal is at a great disadvantage
when other methods of disposal exist, such as wet-air
oxidation or controlled incineration, when munitions
may be uncased or when continuous operations are feas-
ible. Primary disadvantages are the danger in trans-
porting old, sensitive devices, initial investment
required, emplacement costs and dangers in bringing
sensitive ordnance material within sympathetic deton-
ation distances before the shot is fired. Also, in
general, reclamation of the product gases and conver-
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EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL IN CONFINED SPACES - II
Introduction :
Recent public and governmental concern over polluting materials
and their discharge into the environment has caused the military to
take a closer look at its methods of explosives disposal.
Recent methods of disposal have included open burning, incineration,
open detonation, biochemical degradation, partial chemical recovery and
deep ocean dumping. Each of these methods is in some way unsatisfactory
to the environmentalist on the basis of trade-offs that must be made
between safety, cost, and environmental impact.
For example, the open burning of 3.8 tons of trinitrotoluene
1
produces 625 pounds of soot alone, in addition to the toxic gases --
such as carbon monoxide and the oxides of nitrogen -- as well as
increasing the thermal loading of the atmosphere.
2
Another example concerns the chemical recovery of minol by steam
washout, which has had the effect of raising the amount of nitrates
and nitrites in nearby stream and river waters, and thereby causing
eutrophication and , in general, upsetting the ecological balance of
the biosphere.
Another similar situation existed in deep ocean dumping in which
marine life was damaged by the toxic chemicals in the explosive, or its
3
explosion products.
In response to the problems typified by the above examples, research
is now in progress around the country in both military and civilian labor-
atories to find acceptable ways to dispose of waste materials such as
outdated explosives and explosive devices without polluting the
atmosphere.
5.
We have chosen to examine the disposal of explosives by detonation
and/or deflagration in a closed space.
The idea of detonating explosives in a large, air-filled container
is not new. In December 1959 through March 1960, the Atomic Energy
Commission ran a series of chemical explosions, called "Project Cowboy",
ranging from 20 to 2000 pounds in both tamped holes and in 12 and 36 foot
4
diameter spheres, to study seismic phenomena and shock decoupling, also,
the A.E.C., in "Project Sterling", studied ground motion and contain-
ment of a0.35-kT yield nuclear device emplaced in the center of a
cavity created by a previous nuclear explosion in a halite (salt)
medium. This cavity was about 2700 feet deep, approximately spherical
5
,17
and with a diameter of 112 feet.
The concept of disposing of large batch quantities of waste or
outdated explosives in a confined space originated with Professor J.E.
Sinclair, at the Naval Postgraduate School. Parts of this project were
6,7
accomplished by two thesis students — Young and Visted.
Their ideas envisioned large batch quantities of explosives being
destroyed in a large underground chamber, with the resulting polluting
products being vented to processing equipment; to the atmosphere during
meteorologically acceptable conditions; or kept contained for long
periods of time.
Also proposed, was the idea of detonating repeated batch quantities
in the same chamber without venting each time, thereby concentrating the
gases given off in the explosion process. Then, after an appropriate
number of shots, processing the gases to reclaim useful products, or
perhaps expanding them through a generator to produce electricity.
6.
What are some of the explosives available for disposal? The
quantities of explosives that are excess or outdated are not small.
They include many old mines and casings, as well as certain types of
bombs and cartridges, many of these items contain large quantities of
TNT. Others contain HBX, Tetryl , Ammonium Nitrate, White Phosphorous,
flash powder, or smokeless powder. Several of these contain azides as
initiators which may have combined with casing metals to form such
things as copper azide, which is quite sensitive. In addition to the
H.E. and propellants involved, there is a tremendous amount of metal
in these devices. For example, of about 68,000 gross tons of AEDA
material available for disposal, over 68% is hardware. Of the remain-
o
ing 30%, 15% is H.E., and 15% is smokeless powder.
Knowing some of the basic military secondary high explosives
and homogeneous propellants used in these older devices, Young and
Visted set out to make a laboratory model of a confined space disposal
unit from which they could (1) identify the products of the explosion,
(2) determine the variation in concentration of the major components
upon successive shots in the chamber, and (3) measure the static
pressures in the chamber after each shot sequence.
Experimental :
We have constructed a stainless steel cylinder with a capacity of
19.57 L with an airlock provision for loading consecutive samples of
explosives into the chamber without changing the product concentration
or the pressure by more than 0.25% per loading.
Loading was accomplished by placing a blasting cap and a paper
cartridge containing the explosive of interest into the cylinder through
the airlock and firing it remotely through the electrical fixture





Figure 1: Loading and Firinn Positions
8.
FIGURE 2: Detail of Firinn Assembly
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Figure 1 shows the sample chamber.
Ficjure _2_s hows the electrical hook-up through the airlock device.
Test samples were some major military secondary high explosives














In a typical run, the sample was loaded into the paper cartridge
and attached to the blasting cap. This unit then connected to the
wires of the firing circuit and lowered into the cylinder through
the airlock.
The shot was fired remotely and time was allowed for sufficient
mixing of product gases. Three samples were then withdrawn through
the sample valve into evacuated containers for analysis by gas chroma-
tography.
A Fisher gas parti tioner, modified to include a third column
freezing trap, was used for the gas analysis. Gases studied were
oxygen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen-nitrogen oxides.
Hydrogen and methane were also attempted but were not observed in the
sensitivity range of the chroma tograph.
10
Following the withdrawal of the samples, another charge was
placed in the chamber through the airlock and the entire process
repeated until many grams of explosive had been used.
After the final shot of a series and withdrawal of the three
samples, the static pressure was measured, using a pressure gauge
attached to the sample valve. No attempt was made to control the
wall temperature of the cylinder or to decouple the shock from the
cylinder walls. Also, pure compounds were used for the explosive
test samples rather than cased ammunition.
Results :
The results are examined in three groups —
(1) The explosive cartridge itself,
(2) the military secondary high explosives, and
(3) the homogeneous solid propellants.
The explosive cartridge was a standard aluminum shell electric
blasting cap containing approximately .315 grams of pentaerythritol tetra-
nitrate( PETN) as the main initiator and approximately 0.05 grams of
heat sensitive lead styphnate as a primer. The paper cartridge weighed
0.55 grams. The blasting cap and paper shell combination weighed
approximately 3.3 grams. An eight shot sequence was fired for a total
of 30.1 grams of explosive cartridge.
Changes in the gas composition are seen in Figures 4 through 7 .
The major gaseous products stabilized in percentage concentration, in
the area of 18-22 grams of explosive cartridqe detonated. A significant
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FIGURE 5 : EXPLOSIVE CARTRIDGE PERCENT
CARBON DIOXIDE EVOLUTION
6 l1 it it"







FIGURE 6 : EXPLOSIVE CARTRIDGE PERCENT NITROGEN
AND OXIDES OF NITROGEN
EVOLUTION
6 12 18 24
GRAMS OF EXPLOSIVE CARTRIDGE DETONATED
10.
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FIGURE 7 : EXPLOSIVE CARTRIDGE PERCENT CARB
MONOXIDE EVOLUTION
8 16 24 32
GRAMS OF EXPLOSIVE CARTRIDGE DETONATED
13.
The growth of the nitrogen and oxides of nitrogen percentage
concentration was expected because of the nitrocellulose, PETN, and lead
azide ingredients of the explosive cartridge.
The secondary high explosives tested which covered the spectrum
from oxygen rich to oxygen poor, exhibited the same general type
percentage concentration of gases evolved.
From Figure 8 , one can see that the oxygen percentage concentration
exhibited a negative evolution as the oxygen was consumed, but stabilized
at a constant level in the range of 10-12 grams of explosive detonated.
The band of stabilization for the five test explosives varied from 3
to 6 percent oxygen concentration.
In Figure 9 carbon dioxide concentration exhibited a positive
evolution that stabilized at 8-10 grams of explosive detonated. The
band of stabilization varied from 9 to 15% concentration.
Figure 10 shows the positive evolution of carbon monoxide
appearing after 5 to 7 grams of explosive were detonated. The gas
concentration stabilized at 18 to 20 grams of explosive detonated
and maintained a stability range of 6 to 15 percent concentration.
Figure 11 shows the nitrogen and nitrogen oxides' negative
evolution stabilizing at 18 to 20 grams of explosive detonated and
maintaining a stability range of 69 to 75% concentration. No methane
or hydrogen was found during the gas analysis.
Steady-state chamber pressures were measured for some of the high
explosives and were compared to the theoretical calculations by the
Sinclair-Sewell method. Actual steady-state chamber pressures ran
9
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18.
Examination of the detonation chamber after each test sequence
verified the expected solid carbon and aluminum residue.
To determine any long term equilibrium effects, the samples
were analyzed at one day, one week, and two weeks after detonation.
There were no major changes in the gas composition during a period
of two weeks, due in part, to the phenomenon of "kinetic freeze-out".
The homogeneous solid propel lants were then fired in a slightly
modified procedure. The gaseous product concentrations exhibited
much the same pattern as seen with the secondary high explosives.
Figure 12 demonstrates the negative evolution of oxygen stabil-
izing at 20 to 25 grams of propel 1 ant ignited, and a stability range
of 2 to 4 percent concentration.
Figure 13 shows the carbon dioxide positive evolution stabil-
izing at 17 to 20 grams of propel 1 ant ignited and maintaining a
stability range of 17 to 20 percent.
Carbon monoxide positive evolution is shown in Figure 14 , stabil-
izing at 25 grams of propel 1 ant ignited and maintaining a stability range
of 8 to 14 percent. Propel 1 ant 5066 exhibited a small deviation from
the rest but this is thought to be due to its being a double based
propel lant while the others were single based.
Finally, the nitrogen and oxides of nitrogen percentage concentration
stabilized at 20 to 25 grams of propellant ignited and exhibited a
stability range of 66 to 71 percent, as shown in Figure 15 . Neither
methane nor hydrogen was found during the gas analysis.
Homogeneous solid propel lants exhibited the same basic trends as the
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ization and the stability range. This is to be expected in view of
the different reaction mechanism (deflagration versus detonation)
and different chemical composition.
Conclusions and scale-up ;
The basic research done in this laboratory has shown that, at least
in a laboratory scale model disposal chamber, confined chamber disposal
is feasible with predictable gas concentrations and pressures, and,
therefore, warrants more study.
We have shown that for both secondary high explosives and homogeneous
solid propellants, the same type of gaseous product evolution is observed
even though they are of different chemical compositions and operate
under different reaction mechanisms. This indicates that the disposal
of explosives by the confined chamber method is applicable to both
classes of explosives and that the method is, therefore, simplified.
From the data gathered in these experiments and from existing data
10 4 5J1
on blast and shock effects in air, rock, and salt media, it was felt
that a basic feasibility study for a scaled-up site was warranted.
The Cavity :
If a relatively large explosion is detonated underground while in
intimate contact with the surrounding medium, the medium near the point
of detonation will react inelastically and be permanently deformed. Also,
a strong seismic signal capable of being detected at long range will be
generated and transmitted through the earth. The inelastic behavior
of the medium, the strength of the seismic signal generated, and the
probability of detecting the signal are all reduced as the coupling
between the point of the detonation and the medium diminishes. This
reduction in coupling is known as "decoupling".
24.
Maximum decoupling can be achieved if the explosive can be
detonated while at the center of a spherical underground cavity and
at a distance from the cavity walls such that all walls respond
12
elastical ly to the explosion-produced shock waves.
An underground chamber large enough to completely decouple up to
a 2.5 kT * chemical explosive shot and contain all the resultant prod-
uct gases without serious static overpressures can be constructed in
massive, dome-type salt formations provided (1) the salt deposit is
reasonably homogeneous and free from faults, fractures, or weak seams,
12
and (2) the in situ stresses are approximately hydrostatic.
Based on an engineering report to the AEC by Fenix and Scisson
Company, it seems possible to construct such an underground chamber
12
in one of the many salt domes around the country. Figure 16 shows
the primary locations of usable salt formations in the United States,
these cover an area of more than a half-million square miles.
Salt was chosen because it deforms quasi-plastically under
pressure which allows it to absorb the hi qh stress of cavity openinq
as well as beinq self-healing. Under compressive stress, it is
12,11
impervious to the passage of gases and liquids.
In addition, the technology needed to mine the salt exists,
one may apply conventional mining techniques (at considerable cost),
or one may apply current solution mining techniques, at a savings of
more than 50%. Figure 17 shows a schematic of a solution mining
procedure.
*Chemical explosions operate with a different mechanism than nuclear explosion
i.e. longer duration. In general, blast data for nuclear explosions must be



























From Frt»»i 1 > *4




^P To Br. re
f iM) (m) Duposol
* 6" OiO rtolt
Figure 17
SCHEMATIC FOR THE SOLUTION
MINING OF A 315* DIA. SPHERE
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In solution mining, salt is dissolved by controlled circulation
of fresh water and subsequent removal of saturated brine through a
drilled hole equipped with a concentric arrangement of different
sized casings. Modern solution mining can actually shape-control
by using a moveable blanket or air or inert liquid to control the
fluid level in the cavity. Insolubles would be removed by jetting
during development.
Solution mining is safer and easier to do than conventional
mining. It also would provide a means of prompt reversal of ground
support should the walls start to give way within the cavity. Note
that this method, while the less costly of the two, would still cost
about 9,000,000 dollars for a 315 foot diameter sphere 2700 feet




An alternative to the expenditure mentioned, would be the use
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Mechanism of disposal :
As stated before, the quantities of explosives available for disposal
are not small. They are located throughout the country, mostly at ammu-
nition depots. Figure 19 shows the major Navy ammunition depots in the
United States. Notice that most of these are not particularly near any
of the usable salt formations shown previously. This means that to get
to the disposal site, long transportation times and distances are encoun-
tered. This is perhaps one of the big disadvantages to this proposed
system. However, in looking at other disposal systems under consideration
now, it seems likely that these explosives will have to be transported
anyway. It is only a question of the distances and costs of transporta-
tion involved.
Once at the transportation site, the explosives would again have to
be handled in off-loading, stored for a time, and then loaded by some as
yet unspecified means down into the hole. Some suggestions have been
that the explosives be encased in foam while being sent down the tube,
or attached to a conveyor type arrangement. The access shaft cannot
feasibly be made more than 72" cased diameter, which limits the size
of the cased explosives somewhat. Notice that I said cased explosives,
for this is one advantage of this system -- the explosive devices may be
emplaced without uncasing .
However, once in the chamber, the operation becomes a significant
safety hazard. These units must be placed at the center of the sphere
and within sympathetic detonation distances, most likely by human
operators. Also, some method of placing detonators around the huge
mass is needed. These operations are inherently dangerous, although




































After loading, a concrete wedge would be placed in the access
shaft and the high explosive and propellant mass would be remotely
fired, producing copious quantities of gases, variously sized particles
and pieces of metal, and solid carbon in the form of graphite, but which
would be totally contained within the sphere.
Gas overpressures at the end of the shot would not be tremendous.
Indeed, in the 25 ton shot site mentioned earlier, final overpressures
would be in the range of 4 atmospheres (60 psi). Peak detonation
pressures during the blast would be about 92.4 atm (1358 psi) at the
13
wall of the sphere with short duration. Note that this is considerably
less than the overburden pressure at depth which amounts to about
800 bars (11,760 psi) which simply means that the hole would not
12
blow out or get significantly larger.
Pollution Standards :
The reason for this project in the first place was to try to
eliminate the pollution problems associated with explosives disposal.
There are really only three chemical products of any environmental
concern. These are the (1) oxides of nitroqen, (2) carbon monoxide,
and (3) particulates, such as carbon (soot), and the notorious metal
oxide dusts.
NO standards are taken to be those of a nitric acid plant, since
this is a stationary source of "nitric acid". The applicable standard
14
sets the limit on emissions as about 220 ppm measured as NO^. I have
not found an applicable standard for carbon monoxide other than the
federal ambient air quality standard of 9 ppm (10 mg/m ) for 8 hours
maximum, or 35 ppm (40 mg/m ) one hour, max, once per year, which is
31
15
probably very much too low for a stationary source. Particulate
3
standards for soot and metal oxide particles are set at 180 mg/m
16
max, (two hour average) which for carbon works out to be 368 ppm.
In all cases, dilution or processing would be needed.
Product recovery :
Product recovery at this point in the study does not look
entirely feasible. If one were trying to recover NCL to form nitric
acid, to pay for the facility or to use in further synthetic work,
50 tons of TNT would give only 4.2 tons of nitric acid (100% basis)
maximizing the yield of NO at 10% (which is certainly high)* At
the going market prices, this amounts to 453 dollars , which would
hardly pay the transportation costs for one truck load of ordnance,
and certainly would not warrant building a $100,000 - 250,000 product
reclamation plant.
However, 50 tons of TNT would yield about 36 tons of CO, which
conceivably could be used for fuel in a turbine- type electric generator.
Perhaps the most useful products of the explosion would be the
metals left in the shot cavity. If enough shots were fired, it would
be a very rich source of metal ores that might be economically feasible
to mine.
Concl us ions :
Disposal in a confined space at this time in the study , seems
advantageous when one wishes to dispose of large batch quantities of explosive
devices which are perhaps dangerous to uncase, where another method does
not exist, and from the standpoint of environmental impact. The method
* Reference 1 suggests a 7.5% NO from open burning of TNT.
32.
seems to be at a disadvantage when other methods of disposal exist,
such as wet-air oxidation or controlled incineration, when the munitions
may be easily and safely uncased, or when continuous operations are
feasible.
Primary disadvantages are in transporting the old, perhaps sensitive
devices, over long distances, the large initial investment required, and
the dangers of emplacement.
Lastly, in general, reclamation of the gaseous products does not
look practical at this time.
33.
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